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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD, 
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM, SAL-
LAKE COUNTY JAIL, and 
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICF C 
Respondents and Appellees. 
Case MM ,'1)030^)4 CA 
JURSIDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
By order dated Februan, 'il ..'MJ.i (the urrlcr I Ihc llnnl Imliniil Hnlm-l 
Court SRII I il i i ininly denied the petition of Appellant Justin Brent Peterson 
("Peterson") for post-conviction relief. Peterson appeals from the Order. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuaril In I ILili Ludi. him !, /6Aa-S{2){\) 
(2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Did Peterson have the burden of proof? 
A. Standard of Review. ' a leqal issue 
which this Court reviews "for correctness." See Dep't of Human Services v. B.R. 
2002 UT App 25, at fflj 6, I I \2, 4 J I' \\ I .iiJU (applying correctness standard to 
Ct. App 1998) (same). 
B. Preservation. Peterson did not preserve this issue. To the 
contrary, Peterson admitted that he had the burden of proof in the court below. 
See, e ^ , R. 81. 
Issue 2: Did Peterson meet his burden of proof? 
A. Standard of Review. The standard of review for an appeal 
from a dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief depends on the issue 
appealed. Conclusions of law are reviewed "for correctness." Matthews v. 
Galetka. 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah Ct. App 1998); accord Seel v. Van Per Veur. 
971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998). By contrast, findings of fact will only be modified 
on appeal if they are "clearly erroneous." Jd Moreover, this Court surveys "'"the 
record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will not 
reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to 
be convinced that the writ should be granted."'" Matthews. 958 P.2d at 950 
(quoting York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah Ct. App 1994) (quoting 
Butterfield v. Cook. 817 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah Ct. App 1991))); accord Seel. 971 
P.2d at 926. 
B. Preservation. Peterson preserved this issue in the proceeding 
below. See, e.g.. R. 1-5. 
TEXT OF SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
2 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Peterson commenced this case by filing a petition for post-conviction relief 
(the "Petition") alleging that he was sentenced to jail in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. R. 1-5. Peterson claimed in his 
Petition that he was not represented by counsel and did not waive his right to 
counsel. R. 1. 
On December 12, 2002, The Taylorsville Justice Court ("Taylorsville") filed 
its Pre-Hearing Memorandum in response to the Petition. R. 60-67.1 In its Pre-
hearing Memorandum, Taylorsville contended that Peterson waived his right to 
counsel, was not eligible for post-conviction relief because he failed to appeal his 
1
 The other respondents named in the Petition, Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard, 
Chief Paul Cunningham, and the Salt Lake County Jail, were apparently made 
parties solely because Peterson was in their custody when the Petition was filed. 
These other respondents have not taken a substantive position with respect to 
the Petition. See R. 40-43. 
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sentence,2 and did not meet his burden of proving his entitlement to post-
conviction relief. ]a\ 
On January 17, 2003, Judge Sandra N. Peuler of the Third District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, conducted a hearing on the Petition. At 
the hearing, Taylorsville requested that the Petition be dismissed on the grounds 
that it was untimely under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (2002) and that 
Peterson failed to request a trial de novo after the Taylorsville Justice Court 
issued its sentence. R. 145:2-5. The court below denied Taylorsville's request to 
dismiss the Petition on these grounds, and proceeded with the hearing on the 
Petition. R. 145:22-24. 
After hearing the evidence on the substance of the Petition, Judge Sandra 
N. Peuler dismissed the Petition, finding that Peterson did not meet his burden of 
proof and that Peterson made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his 
right to counsel. R. 118. Peterson appealed the dismissal of his Petition. R. 
132-33. 
2
 In a Justice Court case, a criminal defendant is entitled to a trial de novo 
in the District Court if the defendant files a notice of appeal. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-1-120(1) (2002). This right to a trial de novo from a court not of record (like 
a Justice Court) is tantamount to an appeal. See, e.g.. Draper City v. Roper. 
2003 UT App 312,1J5, 78 P.3d 631. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Events Leading to Peterson's Guilty Plea 
On or about February 24, 2000, Peterson was cited for possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 8. Peterson 
has never challenged the substance of the charged offenses. See Exhibit 8; R. 
145:11-12 ("We are not challenging the conviction in this case. We are solely 
challenging the sentence . . . " ) . 
On March 21, 2000, Peterson requested admission to the Taylorsville 
Substance Abuse Program. Exhibit 6; Exhibit 8. The Taylorsville Substance 
Abuse Program provides that upon acceptance and admission to the program 
that the applicant plead guilty and the guilty plea is held in abeyance pending 
successful completion of the program. See Exhibit 6. Upon completion of the 
program the plea will be withdrawn and charges dismissed. See id Peterson 
signed, completed and submitted an "Application for Admission to City of 
Taylorsville Substance Abuse Court" (the "Application"). Exhibit 6. The 
Application included the following paragraph which Peterson initialed: "Counsel. I 
have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge 
were to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge 
could appoint one to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was 
able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me." k l 
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The Application also notified Peterson, among other things, of his right to a 
jury trial, that he was presumed innocent, that Taylorsville was required to prove 
the elements of his crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his conviction 
could be used to enhance penalties for any future convictions. JcL 
Under the Taylorsville Justice Court's supervision, Peterson attended 
weekly drug court reviews from late March through late June 2000. Jd, 
On June 27, 2000, the Taylorsville Justice Court determined that Peterson 
could not participate further in the Taylorsville Substance Abuse Program, and his 
case was set for trial on July 20, 2000. id The docket from the Taylorsville 
Justice Court shows that Peterson appeared before Judge Michael W. Kwan 
("Judge Kwan") at least seven times between March and June 27, 2000. hi 
On July 18, 2000 (two days before the scheduled trial), Peterson appeared 
voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice Court to plead guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 145:40, 44; 
Exhibit 8. Peterson testified that he was familiar with Judge Kwan by the time 
Peterson appeared before him on July 18, 2000. R. 145:33. Peterson also 
acknowledged that he "had appeared numerous times in front of Judge Kwan" 
before July 18, 2000. R.145:41. Likewise, Judge Kwan was also very familiar 
with Peterson. R. 145:55, 59. Peterson had "been a defendant" in Judge Kwan's 
court "for probably over a year on other matters." R. 145:59. 
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The "other matters" to which Judge Kwan referred related to charges 
brought against Peterson for (i) failing to stop at a controlled intersection in 1999 
(Exhibit 1); (ii) playing loud music in 1999 (Exhibit 3); and (iii) failing to pay the 
fine associated with the failure to stop at a controlled intersection charges, 
resulting in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest (Exhibit 1). On February 24, 
2000 (six months before Peterson agreed to plead guilty on the charges at issue 
in this case) Peterson was arrested and brought to Judge Kwan's court. \± At 
this February 24, 2000 hearing, Judge Kwan advised Peterson of his Rule 11 
rights, Peterson signed a "Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights" and 
pleaded guilty to the failure to stop charges. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2; R. 145:31. Also 
on February 24, 2000, Peterson signed a separate "Defendant's Waiver of 
Constitutional Rights" and pleaded guilty to charges against him for "loud music." 
Exhibit 3. Peterson waived his right to counsel with respect to both of the 
charges to which he pleaded guilty on February 24, 2000. Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3. 
Moreover, in June 2000, Peterson pleaded guilty in the Midvale Justice 
Court to (i) reckless driving, possession of a controlled substance and possession 
of paraphernalia, and (ii) driving on a denied driver's license and failure to 
appear. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5; R. 145:30. At this June 2000 hearing, the Midvale 
Justice Court advised Peterson of his rights and he waived his right to counsel in 
both of these cases. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5. 
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B. Peterson's Guilty Plea 
On July 18, 2000, Peterson appeared voluntarily in the Taylorsville Justice 
Court to plead guilty to the charges of possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 145:40,44; Exhibit 8. Peterson entered 
Judge Kwan's courtroom, and remained there while Judge Kwan completed his 
afternoon calendar of about thirty to fifty cases. R: 145:59, 62. 
Judge Kwan completed his calendar for that day and "was wondering why 
[Peterson] was sitting there." R. 145:64. Peterson said he wanted "to take care 
o f his case, and did not want to come back for his trial. R. 145:73. Judge Kwan 
told him to take the written Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Rights (Exhibit 7) 
(the "Waiver") from the podium and "sit down and read it." R. 145:74. Peterson 
"was not happy" that Judge Kwan made him read the Waiver. R. 145:73. 
Peterson acknowledged he signed the Waiver. R. 145:27,41. The Waiver 
stated in part: 
COUNSEL. I have the right to consult with and be 
represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am 
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one 
to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be 
required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
Exhibit 7. Peterson signed his initials after this paragraph. 
The Waiver further informed Peterson of, among other things, his right to a 
jury trial, his right to an appeal, that he was presumed innocent, that each 
element of the charged offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
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that by entering a plea he could face enhanced penalties for future convictions. 
Exhibit 7. 
In addition to the Waiver, Peterson also executed a document entitled 
"Possession of Controlled Substance (marijuana)." Exhibit 9. This document 
explained the elements of the offense of possession of a controlled substance, 
described the applicable penalties for the crime, and the enhanced penalties that 
could apply to Peterson in the future. ]d 
Judge Kwan remained on the bench while Peterson read and signed his 
Waiver. R.145:74. Judge Kwan waited for "[p]robably 10 to 15 minutes" while 
Peterson read the Waiver. R. 145:60. Judge Kwan testified that he knew "for a 
fact" that Peterson read the Waiver. R. 145:59. 
After Peterson read and signed his Waiver, Judge Kwan went through his 
"typical" Rule 11 colloquy twice with Peterson. \dr, R.145:58. The reason Judge 
Kwan went through his Rule 11 colloquy twice on July 18,2000, is that Peterson 
had two separate criminal cases pending against him in Taylorsville, and he 
chose to plead guilty in both cases on July 18, 2000. See R. 115. 
The docket of the Taylorsville Justice Court confirms that Peterson was 
advised of his Rule 11 rights. Exhibit 8. Judge Kwan testified that his colloquy 
included the following: 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he actually read the Waiver. 
9 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he read and understood the English 
language. 
• Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he understood that by entering a 
plea, Peterson would be giving up or waiving each of the 
constitutional rights listed on the Waiver. 
• Judge Kwan informed Peterson that he could go to jail. 
• Judge Kwan informed Peterson that if he wanted an attorney and 
could not afford one, "there was a process that we could go through 
to see if they qualified to have one appointed to them at little or no 
cost." 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if anybody promised him anything to 
induce him to enter his plea. 
• Judge Kwan asked Peterson if anyone threatened him or forced him 
to enter his plea. 
See R. 145:56-58. In addition, when Judge Kwan called his cases individually, 
he reads to the defendant "the charges, the date that it allegedly occurred, 
location." R. 145:55. 
Peterson admitted in his testimony that Judge Kwan advised him of most of 
these rights. R. 145:42-50. Specifically: 
10 
Judge Kwan told Peterson "that by entering a guilty plea in this case 
that it could be used later on to enhance another conviction." R. 145: 
42. 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he read and understood the English 
language. R. 145:49. 
Judge Kwan asked Peterson if he "understood that by entering a 
guilty plea, [he] was giving up" the rights listed on the Waiver. R. 
145:50. 
• Judge Kwan discussed with Peterson "the consequences of a guilty 
plea . . .the fact that you could be sentenced to jail." R. 145:50. 
• Judge Kwan explained to Peterson "how long [Peterson] could be 
sentenced to jail before [he] entered [his] guilty plea." R. 145:50. 
Judge Kwan told Peterson that if he "couldn't afford a lawyer and if 
[he] wanted one, the Court would appoint one for [him]." R. 145:42. 
• Judge Kwan asked if Peterson wanted a lawyer, R. 145:49, and 
Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer. Id 
Based on Judge Kwan's close familiarity with Peterson through this case 
and others, Judge Kwan concluded that Peterson "understood his rights." R. 
145:60. Indeed, Judge Kwan "wouldn't have gone forward" had he "even 
suspected" that Peterson did not understand his rights, kl Although Judge 
Kwan did not specifically recall whether he asked Peterson about his educational 
11 
level, by July 18, 2000 Judge Kwan "was comfortable that [Peterson] understood 
English and understood what we were talking about and he understood the 
consequences of what he was doing." R. 145:74. 
After being advised of and waiving his rights, Peterson entered a guilty plea 
to possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Exhibit 8. Peterson was sentenced to 360 days in jail, and the payment of a fine, 
but with the sentence suspended upon the completion of one year's conditional 
probation. ]d; see also R. 145:109. One of the conditions of Peterson's 
conditional probation was that he appear before Judge Kwan for regular reviews. 
See Exhibit 8. During one of these subsequent reviews, Judge Kwan found that 
Peterson violated his probation, imposed his original jail sentence and sent him to 
the Salt Lake County jail. ]&, During subsequent months Judge Kwan 
suspended the balance of Peterson's sentence, reinstated probation, placed 
Peterson on house arrest with electronic monitoring, issued a bench warrant for 
Peterson's arrest, revoked Peterson's probation and reinstated his sentence with 
credit for time served. Id. 
12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The procedural context of this case is critical. Because this appeal arises 
out of Peterson's collateral challenge to his sentence, there is a strong 
presumption of regularity of the proceedings through which Peterson waived his 
rights. Moreover, in a post-conviction challenge to a sentence (as opposed to a 
direct appeal from a conviction), it is appropriate to consider any evidence 
demonstrating whether Peterson's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of the Petition because Peterson 
adduced no evidence in the court below that his waiver of the right to counsel 
was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
The most striking aspect of this case is that Peterson has never claimed 
that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
Peterson did not testify that his waiver was involuntary; quite the contrary, he 
testified that he appeared voluntarily to waive his rights. He has never claimed 
that he did not know what he was doing when he waived his rights, nor has he 
claimed that he lacked the intelligence to understand the consequences of 
waiving his right to counsel. 
Peterson instead focuses on a rigid mantra that he contends that a trial 
conduct must recite for a waiver of the right to counsel to be effective. Peterson 
argues that because "there is no evidence" that the Taylorsville Justice Court 
recited certain portions of this mantra, his waiver was invalid. However, given the 
13 
presumption of regularity of the proceedings below, and Peterson's failure to 
claim that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the presumption 
of regularity prevails and the court below should be affirmed. 
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to find that Peterson adduced 
sufficient evidence below to meet his burden to rebut the presumption of 
regularity, the court below should still be affirmed. Whether this Court were to 
apply the standard recently announced in Iowa v. Tovar. No. 02-1541, 2004 U.S. 
LEXIS 1837 (March 8, 2004), or the standards applied in Utah cases predating 
the Tovar decision, the evidence demonstrates that Peterson's waiver of his right 
to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THIS APPEAL ARISES OUT OF PETERSON'S 
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON HIS SENTENCE, (A) THE BURDEN IS ON 
PETERSON TO SHOW THAT HIS WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL WAS INVALID, AND (B) THIS COURT'S REVIEW IS NOT 
LIMITED TO THE RECORD OF THE PLEA HEARING. 
The procedural posture of this appeal is critical. Peterson's appeal is from 
the denial of post-conviction relief, as opposed to a direct appeal from Peterson's 
conviction. There are two principal consequences of this procedural posture. 
First, a strong presumption of regularity attaches to Peterson's waiver of his right 
to counsel, and the burden is on Peterson to adduce evidence sufficient to 
overcome this presumption. Second, this Court's review is not limited to the 
record of the plea hearing. Peterson ignores this distinction in his brief. Virtually 
every case Peterson cites in his brief deals with a direct appeal from a conviction 
rather than an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. 
The first principal consequence from this procedural posture is that the 
burden of proof is on Peterson, and there is a presumption of regularity of the 
Taylorsville proceedings. The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
burden on a person challenging a waiver of the right to counsel through post-
conviction relief: "To obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a petitioner must show more 
than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he or she must show that 
the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Salazar v. Warden, 852 
P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added): see also State v. Triptow. 770 P.2d 
15 
146,149 (Utah 1989) (finding in context of post-conviction challenge to 
unappealed conviction that presumption of regularity applies); Gardner v. Holden. 
888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) (burden is on petitioner seeking post-conviction 
relief). This Court recently reaffirmed this burden in a case involving a 
defendant's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moench v. State. 
2004 UT App 57,1J17. A copy of the Moench decision is Addendum A. 
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court recently ruled: "in a collateral 
attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to prove that he 
did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel." 
Iowa v. Tovar. No. 02-1541, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, at*30 (March 8, 2004). A 
copy of the Tovar decision is Addendum B. The United States Supreme Court 
has consistently adhered to the principle "deeply rooted in our jurisprudence: the 
'presumption of regularity' that attaches to final judgments, even when the 
question is the waiver of constitutional rights." Parke v. Raley. 506 U.S. 20, 29 
(1992): accord Daniels v. United States. 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001) (recognizing 
presumption of regularity). This presumption of regularity applies regardless of 
the procedural context of the post-conviction challenge-whether in a habeas 
corpus proceeding or otherwise. Parke. 506 U.S. at 29-30. 
By contrast, the burden is reversed in a direct appeal from a conviction. 
See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 912, 917 (Utah 1998) (arising out of appeal 
of conviction; noting "presumption against waiver, and [that] doubts concerning 
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waiver must be resolved in defendant's favor"); State v. Arquelles, 2001 UT 1, fflj 
1, 70, 63 P.3d 731 (arising out of appeal of conviction; court stated that "we 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right"). Peterson's 
argument in reliance on the presumption against waiver (see Brief of Appellant 
("Peterson's Brief) at 14-15,17, 32) is misplaced. In the context of a post-
conviction challenge to a guilty plea, as opposed to a direct appeal from a 
conviction, the burden is on Peterson to adduce some evidence that he was 
denied his Sixth Amendment rights. Indeed, Peterson acknowledged that he had 
the burden of proof in the proceeding below. R. 81; 145:24. 
The second primary consequence of the procedural posture of this case is 
the evidence considered. A court considering a post-conviction attack on a 
judgment "is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the petitioner 
received from his or her attorneys before entering the plea." Salazar. 852 P.2d at 
992 (affirming denial of habeas corpus relief to prisoner alleging the denial of his 
right to counsel); see also Moench v. State. 2004 UT App 57,1J17 (same); State 
v. Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 95, U 11 (finding that it was appropriate to consider a 
"transcript, testimony regarding taking of the plea, a docket sheet, or other 
affirmative evidence" in a collateral attack on a guilty plea). 
This Court acknowledged the distinction in evidence considered between a 
direct appeal and a collateral challenge in State v. Lehi. 2003 UT App 212, 73 
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P.2d 985. Lehi involved a direct appeal from a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
]d at fl 1. In the procedural posture of Lehi. it was appropriate only to consider 
the plea record, i d at U 9 & n.3. By contrast, in a case involving a collateral 
attack on a judgment, it is appropriate to consider evidence outside of the plea 
record, id. 
In sum, because the case at bar is an appeal from the denial of post-
conviction relief, Peterson bears the burden of proving that his waiver of the right 
to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Further, it is appropriate to 
consider any available evidence that is probative in determining this issue. As 
will be demonstrated below, Peterson utterly failed to meet his burden of proof, 
and therefore the court below should be affirmed. 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PETERSON DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN TO PROVE THAT HIS 
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS INVALID. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranties the 
accused "[i]n all criminal prosecutions . . . the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Nevertheless, the accused may waive the 
right to counsel if the waiver is "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." Iowa v. 
Tovar. No. 02-1541, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, at*30 (March 8, 2004): see also 
State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998) (finding that a defendant's waiver 
of counsel must be "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made"); State v. 
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Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987) (any waiver must be "a voluntary one 
which is knowingly and competently made"). 
It is not disputed in this case that Peterson waived his right to counsel. 
However, Peterson contends that his waiver of this right was in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The proof Peterson adduced 
in the court below is strikingly devoid of any allegation that his waiver of counsel 
was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. Peterson has never claimed that his 
waiver was involuntary; or that he did not understand what he was doing when he 
waived his right to counsel, or that he lacked the intelligence to understand the 
consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel.3 
Peterson's Petition (R. 1) does not assert that his waiver was not knowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent. At most, the Petition asserts that Peterson "was 
sentenced to jail in violation of the Sixth Amendment." Jd. Likewise, not once in 
Peterson's testimony did he claim that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or 
intelligent. SeeR. 145:25-51. Indeed, Peterson acknowledged twice that his 
plea was voluntary. R. 145:40, 43-44. 
3
 While Peterson's counsel made statements to this effect in her opening 
statement, R. 145:15,17, the statements of counsel have no evidentiary value. 
The evidence adduced by Peterson in the proceeding below (which consisted 
solely of Peterson's testimony) does not contain any allegation that Peterson's 
waiver was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. 
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Peterson's own Response to Taylorsville Justice Court's Pre-Hearing 
Memorandum (R. 78) accurately sets forth the extremely limited allegations 
Peterson offered below: 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105, Mr. Peterson, as 
Petitioner in this matter "has the burden of pleading and proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle 
petitioner to relief." The Petition in this matter clearly sets out the 
facts necessary to entitle Mr. Peterson to relief. It has been plead 
and is not disputed that Mr. Peterson entered a guilty plea in the 
Taylorsville Justice Court without the assistance of counsel. It is 
further undisputed that Mr. Peterson was sentenced to 360 days [sic] 
jail in the underlying case. Mr. Peterson has also asserted in the 
Petition that he did not make a constitutionally valid waiver of 
counsel at the time the pleas was entered. As such, Mr. Peterson 
has met his burden in this matter. 
R. 81. Peterson does not offer any actual facts to support his legal conclusion, 
instead relying on the bare assertion that his waiver was not "constitutionally 
valid" to meet his acknowledged burden. 
The question is thus whether conclusory allegations of a constitutional 
violation are sufficient to meet Peterson's burden to demonstrate that his waiver 
of the right to counsel was invalid. The United States Supreme Court recently 
considered this issue in Iowa v. Tovar. No. 02-1541, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837 
(March 8,2004). Tovar. like the instant case, arose out of a "collateral attack on 
an uncounseled conviction." id. at *30. The Court recognized that in this 
procedural context, "it is the defendant's burden to prove that he did not 
completely and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel." id The 
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Court noted that the defendant "has never claimed that he did not fully 
understand the charge or the range of punishment for the crime prior to pleading 
guilty." ]d Nor did the defendant "allege that he was unaware at the . . . 
arraignment of his right to counsel prior to pleading guilty and at the plea 
hearing." jg\ at *17 Instead, he maintained that his waiver of counsel was invalid 
because the trial court had inadequately warned him of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation. ]<± In a unanimous decision, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Iowa Supreme Court's holding that the defendant's waiver of 
his Sixth Amendment rights was invalid. kL at *10. 
Like the defendant in Tovar. Peterson has never claimed that his waiver of 
his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. In the absence of 
any affirmative allegation that Peterson's waiver of counsel was not voluntary, 
knowing, or intelligent, Peterson has failed to meet his burden to prove his waiver 
of Sixth Amendment rights was invalid. Cf Moench v. State. 2004 UT App 57, 
f l , 16-18 (considering merits of petition for post-conviction relief where 
Defendant claimed that he did not enter "a voluntary and knowledgeable guilty 
plea"). 
This Court was presented with a situation similar to Tovar in State v. 
Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 95, 68 P.3d 1035. Like Tovar. Gutierrez involved a 
collateral attack on a guilty plea. The defendant offered no evidence other than a 
"self-serving affidavit asserting his plea was unconstitutional." kL at U12. This 
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Court held that this "affidavit is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
regularity established in Triptow. A defendant must demonstrate the 
involuntariness of his plea by some evidentiary method other than his own bare 
assertions." ig\ 
The case at bar is identical with Gutierrez in that Peterson offered no 
evidence whatsoever in the record below, other than his own self-serving 
testimony. Peterson rested his case below after introducing only his own 
testimony. See R. 145:25-51 (Peterson's case). Peterson did not offer a single 
document into evidence. As in Gutierrez, the presumption of regularity of the 
proceedings below cannot be rebutted with no evidence other than Peterson's 
testimony. 
At bottom, Peterson offers little more in support of his case other than 
arguments that "there is no evidence" that the Taylorsville Justice Court 
conducted a complete colloquy at the plea hearing. See, e.g.. Peterson's Brief at 
26 ("The docket does not indicate that the judge made a determination that Mr. 
Peterson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel"); jcL at 31 ("no 
indication in either the docket or the affidavit that the justice court judge advised 
Mr. Peterson that the right to self-representation is a distinct constitutional right"); 
jd at 38 ("There is no evidence that the justice court judge ascertained that Mr. 
Peterson possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate 
the consequences of proceeding pro se."). 
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The allegations in Guiterrez were similar. That case involved a collateral 
challenge to a guilty plea where defendant alleged "that the judge did not inform 
his of his right to counsel, that he was not offered the assistance of a public 
defender, that he did not read the papers before signing them, and that the judge 
did not explain his right to confront the witnesses against him or to call witnesses 
on his own behalf." Guiterrez. 2003 UT at lf9. This Court found these allegations 
insufficient to challenge the presumption of regularity of his guilty plea. \± at TJ 
13. 
Peterson has utterly failed to meet his burden to show that his waiver of the 
right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. While Peterson often 
claims that "there is no evidence" that Judge Kwan conducted specific colloquies 
with Peterson, in the absence of evidence, the presumption of regularity of the 
Taylorsville proceedings prevails. Peterson has the acknowledged burden of 
introducing specific evidence that his waiver of counsel was not knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent. He has admitted that his waiver was voluntary, and he 
had not testified or otherwise produced evidence to show that his waiver was not 
knowing or intelligent. The court below should be affirmed because Peterson did 
not meet his burden of proof. 
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III. EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO FIND THAT PETERSON ADDUCED 
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT CONSIDERATION OF HIS 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, HIS WAIVER OF THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID. 
A. Standards for Waiver of the Right to Counsel 
Peterson's argument focuses on a rigid mantra that he claims a court must 
recite for a waiver of the right to counsel to be valid. The United States Supreme 
Court recently rejected a similar argument that a court must conduct a specific 
colloquy for the waiver of the right to counsel to be effective. See Iowa v. Tovar. 
No. 02-1541, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, at *23 (March 8, 2004) ("We have not, 
however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states 
that he elects to proceed without counsel"). To the contrary, "[t]he information a 
defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent decision . . . will depend 
on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage 
of the proceeding." i d at *23. 
In the context of the waiver of counsel to enter a guilty plea, the Sixth 
Amendment "is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of 
the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of 
the range of allowable punishments attendant upon entry of a guilty plea." Ig\ at 
*10. The United States Supreme Court clarified that a more searching colloquy is 
required where a defendant seeks to proceed through trial pro se. j d at *24. 
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However, "at the earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal 
colloquy may suffice." id This is so "not because pretrial proceedings are 'less 
important' than trial, but because, at that stage, 'the full dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious to 
the accused than they are at trial.'" ]g\ at *26 (quoting Patterson v. Illinois. 487 
U.S. 285, 299(1988)). 
Prior to the Tovar case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that "before a 
defendant can waive the right to counsel, 'the defendant "should be made aware 
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that.. . he knows 
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."'" State v. Arauelles. 
2003 UT 1, 63 P.2d 731 (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 
1987) (quoting Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). To establish the 
validity of a waiver of the right to counsel, trial courts should do the following: 
"(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to defend himself; (2) 
ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity 
to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself, including the expectation that the defendant will 
comply with technical rules and the recognition that presenting a 
defense is not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascertain 
that the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case." 
State v. Arauelles. 2003 UT 1, 63 P.2d 731 (2003) (quoting State v. Heaton. 958 
P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998)). 
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Taylorsville contends that Tovar overruled Utah precedent to the extent 
Utah cases have required a more searching colloquy than Tovar. See Tovar. 
2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, at *10 (overruling Iowa Supreme Court's requirement of 
two specific warnings that were not necessary under the Sixth Amendment).4 
However, as will be demonstrated below, even if the more detailed requirements 
of the pre-Tovar Utah precedent are applied, Peterson's waiver of his right to 
counsel was valid. 
B. Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the Tovar 
Court's Standards 
Tovar enunciated the standard for a valid waiver of the right to counsel in 
the context of entering a guilty plea as follows: "The constitutional requirement is 
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges 
against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of 
allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." 2004 U.S. 
LEXIS 1837, at * 10. The constitutional requirement was satisfied in the case at 
bar. 
First, Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges against him. It is 
undisputed that Peterson signed Exhibit 9, which indicates that Peterson was 
charged with possession of controlled substance. Moreover, when Judge Kwan 
4
 Peterson has not challenged his sentence on the basis of the Utah 
Constitution, instead, he has relied solely on the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See R. 1-5; Peterson's Brief at 1-2. 
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called Peterson's case, he read to Peterson "the charges, the date that it 
allegedly occurred, location." R. 145:55. It is also clear that Peterson knew the 
nature of the charges against him based on his executing the Waiver, which 
contained a handwritten notation (presumably Peterson's own handwritten 
notation) near the top of the Waiver "POCS + PODP," or possession of controlled 
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 7. Moreover, Peterson 
has never contended that he did not understand the nature of the charges against 
him. 
The docket of the Taylorsville Justice Court independently satisfies this 
requirement. The docket indicated that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 
rights. Exhibit 8. Further, the court below found that Peterson was advised of his 
Rule 11 rights twice on July 18, 2000. R. 115. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
5-122 (2002): "Entries in a justice court judge's docket under Section 78-5-121, 
certified by the judge or his successor in office, are prima facie evidence of the 
facts stated." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides in part that a court may not accept 
a guilty plea unless the judge has found that "the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered ..." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11 (e)(4)(A). Accordingly, the docket constitutes prima facie evidence 
that Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges against him. 
Second, Peterson was informed of his right to be counseled regarding his 
plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(1) requires a judge to determine that "if the 
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defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel." Since the docket (Exhibit 8) 
indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights, the docket constitutes 
prima facie evidence that Peterson was informed of his right to be counseled 
regarding his plea. 
The evidence in the court below was consistent with the docket entry. 
Peterson admitted in his testimony that Judge Kwan told him that if he "couldn't 
afford a lawyer and if [he] wanted one, the Court would appoint one for [him]." R. 
145:42. Peterson also conceded that Judge Kwan asked if Peterson wanted a 
lawyer, R. 145:49, and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer. Jg\ 
Further, the Waiver Peterson executed advised him: "I have the right to consult 
with and be represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am 
too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent 
me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me." Exhibit 7. Finally, Peterson also executed the 
Application (Exhibit 6) which also informed him of his right to counsel. 
Third, Peterson was advised of the range of allowable punishments 
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(5) requires a 
judge accepting a guilty plea to determine that "the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory 
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which 
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a plea is entered, including the possibility of consecutive sentences." Since the 
docket indicates that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 rights (Exhibit 8), the 
docket entry is prima facie evidence that Peterson was advised of the range of 
punishments he faced as a result of his guilty plea. 
Again, the testimony in the proceeding below was consistent with the 
docket. Peterson admitted that Judge Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty 
plea in this case that it could be used later on to enhance another conviction." R. 
145:42. Peterson also admitted that Judge Kwan discussed with him "the 
consequences of a guilty plea . . .the fact that you could be sentenced to jail." 
R. 145:50. And Peterson acknowledged that Judge Kwan explained to him "how 
long [Peterson] could be sentenced to jail before [he] entered [his] guilty plea." R. 
145:50. Peterson also executed Exhibit 9, which explains the penalty and 
enhanced penalty applicable to possession of marijuana. Moreover, Peterson 
has never claimed that he did not understand the range of allowable punishments 
attendant to pleading guilty in this case. 
In sum, even if this Court determines that Peterson presented sufficient 
evidence in the court below to overcome the presumption of regularity, the 
information and warnings the Taylorsville Justice Court conveyed to Peterson 
satisfied the Tovar standard. 
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C. Peterson's Waiver of Counsel Was Valid Under the Pre-Tovar 
Utah Precedent 
Tovar implicitly overruled Utah precedent to the extent it required 
information in addition to the Tovar standard to be conveyed to a defendant 
pleading guilty without counsel. As an example, under pre-Tovar precedent, a 
judge is arguably required to inform a defendant waiving counsel that the 
defendant will need to comply with technical rules, such as the rules of evidence. 
See Arouelles. 2003 UT 1, U 70, 63 P.3d 731. While this type of warning would 
make sense for a criminal defendant proceeding to trial p_ro se, it has no 
application to a defendant who is simply pleading guilty. Said another way, Tovar 
clarified that a wooden recitation of specific warnings which are irrelevant to 
pleading guilty is not required. 
Nonetheless, even if the more exacting standards of Utah's pre-Tovar case 
law are considered, Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel was still valid. 
1. Peterson Was Aware of the Dangers and Disadvantages of 
Self-Representation 
Peterson was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation when he waived his right to counsel in this case. As stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court, a defendant "'"should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that... he knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with eyes open."'" State v. Arouelles. 2003 UT 1, % 70, 63 
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P.3d 731 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 
1987) (quoting Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975))). 
Here, Judge Kwan specifically testified that he "was comfortable that 
[Peterson] understood English and understood what we were talking about and 
he understood the consequences of what he was doing." R: 145:74 (emphasis 
added). Judge Kwan formed this opinion based on his close familiarity with 
Peterson on several cases over the year before Peterson signed the Waiver. 
Indeed, Judge Kwan "wouldn't have gone forward" had he "even suspected" that 
Peterson did not understand his rights. Jg\ 
Peterson was also intimately familiar with the consequences of pleading 
guilty pio se as a result of his having done so in two cases before the Midvale 
Justice Court approximately six months before he waived his right to counsel in 
this case. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5. Peterson had also pleaded guilty and waived 
counsel in connection with two separate cases in the Taylorsville Justice Court in 
1999, the year before the guilty pleas in the instant case. Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3. 
Peterson was no novice to the criminal justice system and the consequences of 
waiving counsel and pleading guilty to crimes. 
Given the above evidence that Peterson was intimately familiar with the 
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and the lack of 
evidence to the contrary, the court below's finding that Peterson's waiver of his 
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right to counsel was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" (R. 118) should be 
affirmed. 
2. Peterson was Advised of His Right to Counsel, and 
Exercised His Constitutional Right to Defend Himself 
It is undisputed that Judge Kwan advised Peterson of his right to counsel. 
Peterson testified that Judge Kwan asked if Peterson wanted a lawyer, R. 145:49, 
and Peterson indicated that he did not want a lawyer. ]a\ Peterson also testified 
that Judge Kwan told him that if he "couldn't afford a lawyer and if [he] wanted 
one, the Court would appoint one for [him]." R. 145:42. The Waiver Peterson 
signed also explained Peterson's right to an attorney, and that "[i]f the judge were 
to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could 
appoint one to represent me." Exhibit 7. Peterson also signed the Application 
(Exhibit 6) which informed Peterson of his right to counsel. 
Peterson attempts on this appeal to make much of his claim that he was 
not advised of his right to self-representation. Peterson's Brief at 31. But it is 
beyond dispute that Peterson knew of this right, since he in fact exercised it in 
this case (and other cases). It strains credulity for Peterson to suggest that his 
sentence should be overturned because he was not advised of a right that he not 
only knew of, but in fact exercised. 
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3. Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson Possessed the 
Intelligence and Capacity to Understand and Appreciate 
the Consequences of his Decision to Represent Himself 
Judge Kwan was very familiar with Peterson and his capacity when 
Peterson entered his guilty plea on July 18, 2000. R. 145:55, 59. Indeed, 
Peterson had appeared before Judge Kwan at least seven times between March 
and June 27, 2000. Exhibit 8. Peterson testified that he was familiar with Judge 
Kwan by the time he appeared before him on July 18, 2000. R. 145:33. 
Peterson also acknowledged that he "had appeared numerous times in front of 
Judge Kwan" before executing the Waiver. R. 145:41. Peterson had "been a 
defendant" in Judge Kwan's court "for probably over a year on other matters." R. 
145:59. It is within the context of a defendant and a judge who were very familiar 
with each other that Peterson's waiver of his right to counsel must be considered. 
Judge Kwan remained on the bench while Peterson read and signed his 
Waiver. R. 145:74. Judge Kwan testified that he knew "for a fact" that Peterson 
read the Waiver. Tr. 59. After completing his calendar on July 18, Judge Kwan 
remained on the bench for "[p]robably 10 to 15 minutes" while Peterson read the 
Waiver. R. 145:60. 
After Peterson read and signed the Waiver, Judge Kwan asked Peterson if 
he actually read the Waiver, and asked Peterson if he read and understood the 
English language. R. 145:56. Peterson conceded that Judge Kwan asked 
Peterson if he read and understood the English language. R. 145:49. 
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Based on Judge Kwan's close familiarity with Peterson on several cases 
over the year before Peterson signed the Waiver, Judge Kwan concluded that 
Peterson "understood his rights." R. 145:60. Indeed, Judge Kwan "wouldn't have 
gone forward" had he "even suspected" that Peterson did not understand his 
rights, jd. Although Judge Kwan did not specifically recall whether he asked 
Peterson about his educational level, by June 18, 2000 Judge Kwan "was 
comfortable that [Peterson] understood English and understood what we were 
talking about and he understood the consequences of what he was doing." R. 
145:74. Similarly, in Moench v. State. 2004 UT App 57, U 19, this Court found 
that a defendant's waiver of counsel was valid based in part on testimony of 
defendant's attorney "that he was confident that Defendant understood the 
contents of the plea affidavit." 
It is also noteworthy that Peterson was not a novice to the criminal justice 
system, and was not unfamiliar with the concept of pleading guilty and waiving his 
right to counsel. See State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 785 (Utah Ct. App 1996) 
(taking into account that "Defendant had previously been involved in a trial" in 
determining defendant intelligently waived his right to counsel); cL State v. 
Valencia. 2001 UT App 159, 27 P.3d 573 (taking into consideration fact that 
defendant had "never experienced a jury trial"). Less than six months before 
Peterson appeared to plead guilty on the charges at issue in the instant case, 
Peterson had appeared before Judge Kwan, pleaded guilty, and waived his right 
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to counsel in connection with two separate cases. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2; Exhibit 3. 
And about a month before Peterson pleaded guilty to the charges at issue in this 
case, Peterson appeared in two separate cases in the Midvale Justice Court, 
pleaded guilty, and waived his right to counsel. Exhibit 4; Exhibit 5. 
Given Peterson's prior experiences in the Taylorsville Justice Court and 
other courts in waiving his right to counsel, Judge Kwan's close familiarity with 
Peterson, and the record in the proceeding below, it is apparent that Judge Kwan 
ascertained that Peterson had the intelligence and capacity to understand his 
decision to waive the right to counsel. Indeed, the court below found that "based 
upon the judge's familiarity and experience with Mr. Peterson, he determined that 
Mr. Peterson was able to represent himself." R. 110-11. Notably, Peterson has 
not claimed that he lacked the intelligence or capacity to understand what he was 
doing on July 18, 2000. Since there is evidence that Peterson's waiver was 
intelligent, and no evidence to the contrary, the court below did not err in finding 
that Peterson's waiver of the right to counsel was intelligent. R. 118. 
4. Judge Kwan Ascertained that Peterson Comprehended 
the Nature of the Charges and Proceedings and the Range 
of Permissible Punishments 
It is undisputed that Peterson was informed of the nature of the charges 
against him and the range of permissible punishments. Notably, Peterson does 
not make a contrary argument in Peterson's Brief. 
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The docket of the Taylorsville Justice Court alone satisfies this 
requirement. The docket indicated that Peterson was advised of his Rule 11 
rights. Likewise, the court below found that Judge Kwan completed two Rule 11 
colloquies with Peterson on July 18, 2000. R. 115. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) 
provides in part that a court may not accept a guilty plea unless the judge has 
found that "the defendant understands the nature of the elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered ..." Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(4)(A). This rule also 
requires the court to determine that "the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the 
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
entered." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). Since the docket entry constitutes prima 
facie evidence of the facts stated, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-122 (2002), the docket 
is prima facie evidence that Peterson was advised of the nature of the charges 
against him and the range of permissible punishments. 
Moreover, Peterson's own testimony establishes that he knew of the range 
of punishments he could face by pleading guilty. Peterson admitted that Judge 
Kwan told him "that by entering a guilty plea in this case that it could be used later 
on to enhance another conviction." R. 145:42. Peterson also admitted that 
Judge Kwan discussed with him "the consequences of a guilty plea . . .the fact 
that you could be sentenced to jail." R. 145:50. And Peterson acknowledged that 
Judge Kwan explained to him "how long [Peterson] could be sentenced to jail 
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before [he] entered [his] guilty plea." R. 145:50. In addition to this colloquy, 
Peterson executed Exhibit 9, which explains the penalty and enhanced penalty 
applicable to possession of marijuana. 
The evidence in the proceeding below also demonstrated that Peterson 
was informed of the nature of the charges against him. Peterson signed Exhibit 
9, which indicates that Peterson was charged with Possession of Controlled 
Substance (marijuana). Moreover, when Judge Kwan called his cases, he reads 
to the defendant "the charges, the date that it allegedly occurred, location." Tr. 
145:55. It is also clear that Peterson knew the nature of the charges against him 
based on his executing the Waiver, which stated at the top that the charges 
against him were "POCS + PODP," or possession of controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Exhibit 7. 
In short, there was ample evidence to demonstrate that Peterson's guilty 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, even if the factors considered by 
pre-Tovar Utah decisions are considered. The court below correctly concluded 
that Peterson "made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to 
counsel," (R. 118), and therefore this Court should affirm the dismissal of 
Peterson's Petition. 
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IV. EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETERSON MET HIS BURDEN OF PROVING 
THAT HIS WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS INVALID, THIS 
COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS CASE TO THE TAYLORSVILLE 
JUSTICE COURT FOR SENTENCING. 
Taylorsviile concurs with Peterson's Brief to the extent that it argues that if 
Peterson's waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights was invalid, the appropriate 
remedy is to invalidate only "the aspect of Mr. Peterson's sentence that imposes 
a suspended jail sentence." Peterson's Brief at 46. This is consistent with 
Peterson's position below that "Mr. Peterson, in his Petition does not challenge to 
[sic] underlying conviction only the Court's imposition of jail in violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right to Counsel." R. 82; see ajso R. 145:11-12 ("We are not 
challenging the conviction in this case. We are solely challenging the sentence . . 
."); R. 80 ("Mr. Peterson challenges the legality of the sentence imposed."). 
Indeed, the statute which provides for post-conviction relief suggests that 
the appropriate remedy here, where Peterson does not challenge his underlying 
conviction, is to remand this case for a new sentencing proceeding. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-108(1) (2002) ("If the court grants petitioner's request for 
relief, it shall either: (a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or (b) vacate 
the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or sentencing proceeding 
as appropriate."). Peterson has not requested a modification of his original 
conviction or sentence, and therefore alternative (a) of Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
108(1) is not applicable. Similarly, Peterson has not challenged his conviction, 
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and therefore under alternative (b), the appropriate remedy is to "vacate the 
original... sentence and order a new.. . sentencing proceeding." \_± 
Accordingly, even if Peterson prevails on this appeal, his convictions in the 
Taylorsville Justice Court must stand, and this Court should remand the case to 
the Taylorsville Justice Court for a new sentencing proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Peterson failed to meet his burden to prove that his waiver of the right to 
counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the dismissal of Peterson's Petition. 
Respectfully Submitted 31st day of March, 2004. 
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS 
A Professional Corporation 
J0f)fi N. Brems 
/peorge B. Hofmann 
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OPINION: BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
[*P1] Defendant Andrew D. Moench appeals the trial 
court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief 
that challenged his conviction for aggravated assault with 
a gang enhancement, nl a second-degree felony. Moench 
argues that he (1) was improperly sentenced under the 
gang enhancement statute, (2) did not enter a voluntary 
and knowledgeable guilty plea, and (3) received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (2003), is more properly 
referred to as the "group criminal activity" statute. 
However, because Utah courts commonly refer to 
it as the "gang enhancement" statute, for purposes 




[*P2] On October 31, 1998, Defendant, a "Straight 
Edge" gang member, together with several gang 
associates, was involved in a fight with another group of 
men including the victim, Bernardo Repreza. During the 
fight, Defendant and Jason Cunningham chased Repreza 
while Sean Darger yelled at the two to "get him." 
Cunningham struck Repreza with an expandable police 
baton causing Repreza to fall. Defendant then struck 
Repreza in the head with a club or a bat resulting in 
serious bodily injury. Subsequently, while Repreza lay 
unconscious from the beating, a fourth person, Collin 
Ressor, stabbed Repreza, causing his death. 
[*P3] Defendant originally was charged with murder, a 
first-degree felony, subject to a gang enhancement. 
However, the State, as part of plea bargain negotiations, 
offered to reduce the charge to aggravated assault, a 
second-degree felony, subject to a gang enhancement. In 
a separate paragraph, the second amended information 
stated that Defendant was subject to an enhanced penalty 
because the crime was committed in concert with two or 
more persons. The State also agreed that if the court 
sentenced Defendant to prison, the State would remain 
[**3] silent on a motion to reduce the degree of the 
offense to a third-degree felony. 
nl The gang enhancement statute, see Utah 
[*P4] On October 20, 1999, Defendant accepted the 
State's plea offer and pleaded guilty to committing an 
2004 UT App 57, *; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 24, ** 
Page 2 
aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons. 
In particular, Defendant's plea affidavit set forth the 
elements of Defendant's crime as "the actor commits an 
assault and intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another. He does so in concert with two or more people." 
Additionally, Defendant admitted to the following facts 
in his affidavit: 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the 
elements of the crime charged are as follows: On October 
31, 1998, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I intentionally 
struck Bernardo Repreza in the head with a club. 
According to Dr. Leis[, an assistant medical examiner for 
the State of Utah], this resulted in serious bodily injury. 
Immediately prior to my striking him, Jason Cunningham 
struck him with a baton. We had been urged to chase and 
"get him" by a third person. 
Defendant also stated in his plea affidavit, "I know that if 
I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead 
'not [**4] guilty1 and the matter will be set for trial. At 
the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving 
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." 
[*P5] During the plea colloquy, Defendant's attorney 
stated that Defendant had read and understood the plea 
affidavit and that Defendant had signed it in his presence. 
When questioned by the court, Defendant indicated that 
he intended to plead guilty to the second amended 
information charging him with aggravated assault with a 
gang enhancement. Defendant stated that he was satisfied 
with the advice of his attorney. Defendant also admitted 
to the facts constituting the aggravated assault charge 
with a gang enhancement. Additionally, Defendant stated 
that he understood that by admitting and pleading to the 
charge, he was admitting to every element of the offense. 
Defendant further indicated that he understood that the 
penalty for the aggravated assault with the gang 
enhancement was six to fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison. Defendant then pleaded guilty to the charge of 
second degree aggravated assault with a gang 
enhancement. 
[*P6] On December 15, 1999, Defendant was sentenced 
to six to fifteen years [**5] at the Utah State Prison. The 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were 
entered on February 15, 2000. Defendant timely filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief on February 15, 2001, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated sections 78-35a-101 to 
-304 (1996) and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. The 
trial court dismissed Defendant's petition as frivolous on 
its face. On appeal, we held the trial court erred when it 
found the petition frivolous on its face, and we reversed 
and remanded directing the State to file a response and 
for the court to hold, if necessary, an evidentiary hearing. 
[*P7] On December 4, 2002, the trial court ordered the 
State to respond to Defendant's petition, and on March 4, 
2003, the trial court heard oral arguments. The trial court 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order denying Defendant's petition for post-conviction 
relief on March 31, 2003. Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P8] Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
denying his petition for post-conviction relief because he 
had (1) been sentenced improperly under the gang 
enhancement statute without every [**6] element of the 
crime having been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, (2) not entered a voluntary and knowledgeable 
guilty plea, and (3) received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. "We review an appeal from an order dismissing 
or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for 
correctness without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions of law." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, P4, 
43 P.3d 467 (citing Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 252 
(Utah 1998)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Gang Enhancement Statute 
[*P9] Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
sentencing him under the gang enhancement statute 
without having established each element of the gang 
enhancement statute beyond a reasonable doubt either (1) 
at a trial where the State proved the criminal liability of 
the others involved in the incident, or (2) through guilty 
pleas to identical crimes by the others involved in the 
incident. We disagree. 
[*P10] The gang enhancement statute provides an 
increased penalty for certain crimes if committed "in 
concert with two or more persons." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-203.l(l)(a) (1998). To be guilty of acting "in 
concert" [**7] under section 76-3-203. l(l)(a), the actors 
"must (i) have possessed a mental state sufficient to 
commit the same underlying offense and (ii) have 
directly committed the underlying offense or solicited, 
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally 
aided one of the other two actors to engage in conduct 
constituting the underlying offense." State v. Lopes, 1999 
UT24,P8,980P.2dl91. 
[*P11] The Utah Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of section 76-3-203.1 (5)(c) in State v. 
Lopes. As originally drafted, the statute required "the 
sentencing judge rather than the jury [to] decide whether 
to impose the enhanced penalty . . . contingent upon a 
finding by the sentencing judge that this section is 
applicable." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)(c) (Supp. 
1999). The supreme court stated that the gang 
enhancement statute "mandated imposition of an 
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enhancement only upon proof of elements over and 
above those required for the crime of lesser 
consequence." Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at P 15. The court 
reasoned that because the statute created a separate 
offense apart from the underlying offense, each element 
must [**8] be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a 
jury rather than the trial judge. See id. at PI 7. Thus, the 
court concluded that subsection (5)(c) violated Lopes's 
right to a jury trial under article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. See id. 
[*P12] Defendant argues that the holding in Lopes 
prevents a defendant from pleading guilty to a gang 
enhancement without either (1) a trial where the State 
proves the criminal liability of the in-concert actors 
involved in the incident or (2) the actors pleading guilty 
to the identical crime. Defendant relies upon the 
following statement in Lopes to support this contention: 
"Even though Lopes pled guilty to the underlying 
offense, his plea did not establish the requisite mental 
state of the other actors, as is necessary to support 
imposition of the gang enhancement." Id. However, 
under the particular facts of Lopes, the defendant entered 
a conditional guilty plea to the gang enhancement, 
preserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of the 
statute. See id. at P3. The defendant in Lopes "never 
conceded that all the elements of the enhancement statute 
were satisfied, i.e., that the other individuals [**9] 
shared the requisite mental state for murder." Id. at P4 
n.3. 
[*P13] Unlike the defendant in Lopes, Defendant in this 
case entered an unconditional plea admitting that he had 
committed an aggravated assault "in concert with two or 
more people." Defendant admitted the elements of both 
the aggravated assault and the gang enhancement in his 
plea affidavit. In particular, Defendant admitted that he 
had committed an aggravated assault in concert with 
Cunningham, who had beat Repreza with an expandable 
police baton, and Darger, who had encouraged both 
Cunningham and Defendant to "get" Repreza. 
[*P14] Furthermore, the supreme court indicated in 
Lopes that defendants may plead guilty to a crime with a 
gang enhancement without a finding by a jury of the 
requisite elements. Id. at P22. In particular, the court 
stated in Lopes that "since the elements of the crime were 
not established against Lopes, either by his plea or by a 
jury trial, he was deprived of his due process rights as 
guaranteed by the federal and Utah constitutions." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
[*P15] Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly 
sentenced Defendant under the [**10] gang 
enhancement statute because Defendant admitted every 
element of both the underlying crime and the gang 
enhancement. Thus, we affirm Defendant's sentence 
under the gang enhancement statute. 
II. Validity of Defendant's Plea 
[*P16] Defendant contends the trial court erred in 
finding that Defendant's guilty plea was entered 
knowingly and voluntarily. Specifically, Defendant 
asserts that his guilty plea was invalid because the trial 
court did not comply strictly with rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure when it failed to ascertain 
whether Defendant understood the nature and the 
elements of aggravated assault with a gang enhancement. 
Defendant further argues that his plea was insufficient to 
establish the factual basis for imposing the gang 
enhancement. 
[*P17] "The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure that a 
defendant knows of his or her rights and thereby 
understands the consequences of a decision to plead 
guilty.'" State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, P18, 69 P.3d 
838 (quoting State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, P22, 26 
P.3d 203). "The findings mandated by rule 11 'may be 
based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
[**11] used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the 
court has established that the defendant has read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit.'" State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, PI2, 22 P. 3d 
1242 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8)). While it is the 
responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that strict 
compliance with rule 11 is established, '"strict 
compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so 
long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long 
as the record reflects that the requirement has been 
fulfilled.'" State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 
218 (Utah 1991)). However, in post-conviction relief 
cases, "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a 
guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a 
defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United 
States Constitution." Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 
992 (Utah 1993). To obtain post-conviction relief, 
Defendant must show more than a violation of the 
prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he . . . must show that 
the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary. 
[**12] Further, a court considering such a claim is not 
limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at 
the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the 
information [Defendant] received from his . . . attorney [] 
before entering the plea. 
Id. 
[*P18] Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
accepting his guilty plea without verifying that he 
understood the nature and elements of aggravated assault 
and the gang enhancement. Defendant claims that he did 
not understand the elements of his crime because the trial 
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court never informed him during the plea colloquy that 
the gang enhancement could not be imposed unless the 
State had established accomplice liability. However, as 
addressed above, it is unnecessary for the State to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the other 
participants; the gang enhancement may be imposed 
based solely on Defendant's guilty plea. 
[*P19] Moreover, the record demonstrates that 
Defendant understood he was pleading guilty to 
aggravated assault with a gang enhancement. In 
particular, Defendant's plea affidavit set forth the 
elements of Defendant's crime as "the actor commits an 
assault and intentionally causes [**13] serious bodily 
injury to another. He does so in concert with two or more 
people." During the plea colloquy, Defendant's attorney 
indicated that he was confident that Defendant 
understood the contents of the plea affidavit. Upon 
questioning by the trial court, Defendant stated that he 
intended to plead guilty to the second amended 
information charging him with aggravated assault with a 
gang enhancement. Defendant admitted to facts 
constituting the elements of the aggravated assault with a 
gang enhancement in his plea affidavit and during the 
plea colloquy. Defendant also indicated he understood 
that the penalty for aggravated assault with a gang 
enhancement was six to fifteen years. Thus, we hold that 
the trial court properly concluded that Defendant's plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
[*P20] Defendant argues that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney (1) persuaded 
him to enter a guilty plea when he knew or should have 
known that the State could not have proven its initial 
case of first-degree murder, and (2) allowed him to enter 
a guilty plea without a factual basis for the plea. 
[*P21] [** 14] To demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Defendant must establish '"that his counsel 
rendered deficient performance which fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
him."' State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 190, P4, 5 P.3d 
1228 (quoting State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, P20, 984 
P.2d 376); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687, 104 S Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 
To prevail on the first prong, [Defendant] must 
overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance. [Defendant] must identify specific 
acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's 
representation failed to meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness. We give counsel wide latitude to make 
tactical decisions and will not question such decisions 
unless we find no reasonable basis for them. 
Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) 
(quotations and citations omitted). In evaluating this 
prong, a court must make every effort to "eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight" and "evaluate the conduct 
from counsel's perspective [**15] at the time." 
Strickland, 466 US at 689, 104 S Ct. at 2065. "As to 
the second prong, [Defendant] must proffer evidence 
sufficient to support a recisonable probability that, but for 
his counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Taylor, 905 P.2d 
at 282 (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, 
"where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show 
'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he 
[or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 525 (Utah 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hilly. Lockhart, 474 US. 52, 59, 106S Ct. 366, 370, 88 
L.Ed. 2d 203 (1985)). 
[*P22] Defendant argues that his attorney's conduct fell 
below the objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and this allegedly deficient conduct prejudiced 
Defendant. Specifically, under Defendant's original 
charge of murder, Defendant asserts that the State could 
not have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant's conduct "created [**16] a grave risk to 
[Repreza] and thereby caused the death of [Repreza,]" or 
that he caused serious bodily injury to Repreza which 
caused his death. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(b), 
(2)(c) (1998). For this reason, Defendant concludes that a 
reasonably prudent attorney would have known that a 
jury could not have found Defendant guilty of murder 
because the evidence demonstrated that Defendant's blow 
to Repreza did not and would not have caused Repreza's 
death. Defendant further asserts that Darger's subsequent 
acquittal on the murder charge for the same incident 
demonstrates that Defendant likely also would have been 
acquitted of murder. 
[*P23] The State argues that although the evidence 
might have established that Defendant did not directly 
cause Repreza's death, Defendant could have been 
convicted as an accomplice to murder pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated section 76-2-202 (1999). This statute 
provides that a person who possesses the requisite mental 
state and "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense" may be convicted of the 
offense as [**17] an accomplice, even though that 
person did not directly commit the offense. Id. The State 
concludes that because the beating Defendant inflicted on 
Repreza rendered him unconscious, it provided Ressor 
the opportunity to stab and kill him. The State also 
asserts that the acquittal of Darger is a poor indicator for 
predicting what would have occurred had Defendant 
gone to trial because, as the trial court found, Darger was 
2004 UT App 57, *; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 24, ** 
Page 5 
not as culpable as Defendant in that Darger never struck 
Repreza. The State further argues that comparing the 
outcome of Darger's trial with the hypothetical outcome 
of Defendant's trial is exactly the type of second-
guessing hindsight prohibited by Strickland. See 466 
U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. 
[*P24] We agree with the State. Defendant has not 
demonstrated that his counsel's conduct fell below an 
objectively reasonable standard if we "eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight." Id at 689, 104 S Ct. at 
2065. Defendant has failed to "overcome the 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged 
action 'might be considered sound . . . strategy.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). Because Defendant has [**18] failed 
to establish the deficient-performance prong of the 
Strickland test, "counsel's assistance was constitutionally 
sufficient, and we need not address the other part of the 
test." State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, P14, 34 P.3d 
187. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P25] We conclude that the trial court properly denied 
Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief because 
Defendant (1) was properly sentenced under the gang 
enhancement statute, (2) entered a voluntary and 
knowledgeable guilty plea, and (3) received effective 
assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
[*P26] WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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SYLLABUS: At respondent Tovar's November 1996 
arraignment for operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol (OWI), in response to the trial 
court's questions, Tovar affirmed that he wanted to 
represent himself and to plead guilty. Conducting the 
guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the court explained that, if Tovar 
pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy and 
public jury trial where he would have the right to counsel 
who could help him select a jury, question and cross-
examine witnesses, present evidence, and make 
arguments on his behalf. By pleading guilty, the court 
cautioned, Tovar would give up his [*2] right to a trial 
and his rights at that trial to be represented by counsel, to 
remain silent, to the presumption of innocence, and to 
subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony. The 
court then informed Tovar of the maximum and 
minimum penalties for an OWI conviction, and 
explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court 
had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the 
charged offense. To that end, the court informed Tovar of 
the two elements of the OWI charge: The defendant must 
have (1) operated a motor vehicle in Iowa (2) while 
intoxicated. Tovar confirmed, first, that on the date in 
question, he was operating a motor vehicle in Iowa and, 
second, that he did not dispute the result of the 
intoxilyzer test showing his blood alcohol level exceeded 
the legal limit nearly twice over. The court then accepted 
his guilty plea and, at a hearing the next month, imposed 
the minimum sentence of two days in jail and a fine. In 
1998, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a 
second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa 
law. Represented by counsel in that proceeding, he 
pleaded guilty. In 2000, Tovar was charged with third-
offense OWI, a class "D" felony under [*3] Iowa law. 
Again represented by counsel, Tovar pleaded not guilty 
to the felony charge. Counsel moved to preclude use of 
Tovar's first (1996) OWI conviction to enhance his 2000 
offense from an aggravated misdemeanor to a third-
offense felony. Tovar maintained that his 1996 waiver of 
counsel was invalid — not fully knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary — because he was never made aware by the 
court of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. The trial court denied the motion, found 
Tovar guilty, and sentenced him on the OWI third-
offense charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but 
the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and remanded for 
entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first 
OWI conviction. Holding that the colloquy preceding 
acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been 
constitutionally inadequate, Iowa's high court ruled, as 
here at issue, that two warnings not given to Tovar are 
essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea stage: The 
defendant must be advised specifically that waiving 
counsel's assistance in deciding whether to plead guilty 
(1) entails the risk that a viable defense will be 
overlooked [*4] and (2) deprives him of the opportunity 
to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the 
facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. 
Held: Neither warning ordered by the Iowa Supreme 
124 S. Ct. 1379; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, *; 
72U.S.L.W.4241;17 
Court is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The 
constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court 
informs the accused of the nature of the charges against 
him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and 
of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the 
entry of a guilty plea. Pp. 8-15. 
(a) The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing 
incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical stages" of 
the criminal process, see, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 
U.S. 159, 170, 88 L. Ed 2d 481, 106 S Ct. 477, 
including a plea hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 
60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S Ct. 1050 (per curiam). 
Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his 
first OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at 
the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the 
charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US. 25, 34, 37, 32 L. 
Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. Although an accused may 
choose to forgo representation, any waiver of the right to 
counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and [*5] 
intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US. 458, 464, 82 
L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. The information a defendant 
must possess in order to make an intelligent election 
depends on a range of case-specific factors, including his 
education or sophistication, the complex or easily 
grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the 
proceeding. See Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 
1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Although warnings of the pitfalls of 
proceeding to trial uncounseled must be "rigorously" 
conveyed, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389; see Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525, a 
less searching or formal colloquy may suffice at earlier 
stages of the criminal process, 487 U.S., at 299, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. In Patterson, this Court 
described a pragmatic approach to right-to-counsel 
waivers, one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve 
at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and 
what assistance [counsel] could provide to an accused at 
that stage." Id, at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 
2389. Less rigorous warnings are required pretrial 
because, at that stage, "the full dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less 
substantial and more obvious [*6] to an accused than 
they are at trial." Id, at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S 
Ct. 2389. Pp. 8-11. 
(b) The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two 
admonitions ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court. "The 
law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, 
and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands 
the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in 
general in the circumstances.. . ." United States v. Ruiz, 
536 U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S. Ct. 2450. 
Even if the defendant lacked a full and complete 
appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his 
waiver, the State may nevertheless prevail if it shows that 
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the information provided to the defendant satisfied the 
constitutional minimum. Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 
L. Ed 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389. The Iowa high court gave 
insufficient consideration to this Court's guiding 
decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and 
holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance, that 
court overlooked this Court's observations that the 
information a defendant must have to waive counsel 
intelligently will depend upon the particular facts and 
circumstances in each case, Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019. Moreover, as Tovar 
acknowledges, [*7] in a collateral attack on an 
uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to 
prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive 
his right to counsel. Tovar has never claimed that he did 
not fully understand the 1996 OWI charge or the range of 
punishment for that crime prior to pleading guilty. He 
has never "articulated with precision" the additional 
information counsel could have provided, given the 
simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 
101 L. Ed 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Nor does he assert 
that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to 
and at his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests 
only that he may have been under the mistaken belief that 
he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was, 
instead, going to plead guilty. Given "the particular facts 
and circumstances surrounding [this] case," Johnson, 304 
U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed 2d 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019, it is far 
from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa 
Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision 
whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case 
so straightforward, the two admonitions at issue might 
confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would 
inform him, [*8] i.e., the warnings might be 
misconstrued to convey that a meritorious defense exists 
or that the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when 
neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays 
his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a 
tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal 
charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be 
impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the 
defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is 
financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be 
wasted. States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or 
decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled 
plea they deem useful, but the Federal Constitution does 
not require the two admonitions here in controversy. Pp. 
11-15. 
656 N. W. 2d 112, reversed and remanded. 
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JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the 
Court 
The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who 
faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical 
stages of the criminal process Maine v Moult on 474 
US 159, 170, 88 L Ed 2d 481, 106 S Ct 477 (1985), 
United States v Wade, 388 US 218 224 18 L Ed 2d 
1149 87 S Ct 1926(1967) [*9] The entry of a guilty 
plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks 
as a "critical stage" at which the right to counsel adheres 
Argersmger v Hamlin 407 U S 25 34 32 L Ed 2d 
530, 92 S Ct 2006(1972), White v Maryland 373 US 
59 60 10 L Ed 2d 193, 83 S Ct 1050 (1963) (per 
curiam) Waiver of the right to counsel, as of 
constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, 
must be a "knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances" Brady v 
United States 397 US 742, 748, 25 L Ed 2d 747, 90S 
Ct 1463 (1970) This case concerns the extent to which a 
trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea from an 
uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to 
representation 
Beyond affordmg the defendant the opportunity to 
consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to be 
assisted by counsel at the plea hearmg, must the court, 
specifically (1) advise the defendant that "waiving the 
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty 
[entails] the risk that a viable defense will be 
overlooked", and (2) "admonish" the defendant "that by 
waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the 
opportunity to obtain an independent opmion on [*10] 
whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to 
plead guilty"? 656 NW2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003) The 
Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings essential to the 
"knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment 
right to the assistance of counsel Ibid 
We hold that neither warning is mandated by the 
Sixth Amendment The constitutional requirement is 
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the 
nature of the charges agamst him, of his right to be 
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of 
allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a 
guilty plea 
I 
On November 2, 1996, respondent Felipe Edgardo 
Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was arrested in 
Ames, Iowa, for operatmg a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol (OWI) See Iowa Code § 321J 2 
(1995) nl An intoxilyzer test administered the night of 
Tovar's arrest showed he had a blood alcohol level of 
0 194 App 24 The arresting officer informed Tovar of 
his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 436, 16 L 
Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602 (1966) Tovar signed a form 
statmg that he waived those rights and agreed to answer 
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questions Iowa State Umv Dept of Public [* 11] Safety, 
OWI Supplemental Report 3 (Nov 2, 1996), Lodging of 
Petitioner, Iowa State Umv Dept of Public Safety, 
Rights Warnings (Nov 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner 
nl "A person commits the offense of 
operating while intoxicated if the person operates 
a motor vehicle in this state in either of the 
following conditions a While under the 
influence of an alcoholic beverage b While 
having an alcohol concentration of 10 or 
more " Iowa Code § 321J 2(1) (1995) 
Some hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a 
judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County The 
judge mdicated on the Initial Appearance form that Tovar 
appeared without counsel and waived application for 
court-appointed counsel Initial Appearance in No 
OWCR 23989 (Nov 2, 1996), Lodgmg of Petitioner The 
judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar was 
"informed of the charge and his rights and received a 
copy of the Complamt" Ibid Arraignment was set for 
November 18, 1996 In the interim, [*12] Tovar was 
released from jail 
At the November 18 arraignment, n2 the court's 
inquiries of Tovar began "Mr Tovar appears without 
counsel and I see, Mr Tovar, that you waived application 
for a court appomted attorney Did you want to represent 
yourself at today's hearmg9" App 8-9 Tovar replied 
"Yes, sir" Id, at 9 The court soon after asked "How did 
you wish to plead9" Tovar answered "Guilty " Ibid 
Tovar affirmed that he had not been promised anythmg 
or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty 
Id, at 13-14 
n2 Tovar appeared in court along with four 
other individuals charged with misdemeanor 
offenses App 6-10 The presiding judge 
proposed to conduct the plea proceeding for the 
five cases jointly, and each of the individuals 
mdicated he did not object to that course of 
action Id, at 11 
Conductmg the guilty plea colloquy required by the 
Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule Crun 
Proc 8 (1992), n3 the court explamed that, if Tovar 
pleaded not guilty, [*13] he would be entitled to a 
speedy and public trial by jury, App 15, and would have 
the right to be represented at that trial by an attorney, 
who "could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and 
cross-examine the State's witnesses, present evidence, if 
any, m [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and 
jury on [his] behalf," id, at 16 By pleadmg guilty, the 
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court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] 
right to a trial [of any kind on the charge against him], 
[he would] give up [his] right to be represented by an 
attorney at that trial." lb id. The court further advised 
Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would 
relinquish the right to remain silent at trial, the right to 
the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena 
witnesses and compel their testimony. Id., at 16-19. 
n3 The Rule has since been renumbered 2.8. 
Turning to the particular offense with which Tovar 
had been charged, the court informed him that an OWI 
conviction carried a maximum penalty [* 14] of a year in 
jail and a $ 1,000 fine, and a minimum penalty of two 
days in jail and a $ 500 fine. Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed 
that he understood his exposure to those penalties. Ibid. 
The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty 
plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact 
guilty of the charged offense. Id., at 21-22. To that end, 
the court informed Tovar that the OWI charge had only 
two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was 
operating a motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, 
when he did so, he was intoxicated. Id., at 23. Tovar 
confirmed that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on 
the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute 
the results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the 
police that night, which showed that his blood alcohol 
level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. Id., at 
23-24. 
After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar if he 
still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that he 
did. Id., at 27-28. The court then accepted Tovar's plea, 
observing that there was "a factual basis" for it, and that 
Tovar had made the plea "voluntarily, with a full 
understanding of [his] rights, [*15] [and] . . . of the 
consequences of [pleading guilty]." Id., at 28. 
On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for 
sentencing on the OWI charge n4 and, simultaneously, 
for arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a 
suspended license. Id., at 45-46; see Iowa Code § 
32IJ.2I (1995). n5 Noting that Tovar was again in 
attendance without counsel, the court inquired: "Mr. 
Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's 
hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an 
attorney to represent you?" App. 46. n6 Tovar replied 
that he would represent himself. Ibid. The court then 
engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the 
suspension charge as it had on the OWI charge the 
previous month. Id., at 48-51. After accepting Tovar's 
guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court sentenced 
him on both counts: For the OWI conviction, the court 
imposed the minimum sentence of two days in jail and a 
$ 500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension 
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conviction, the court imposed a $ 250 fine, plus a 
surcharge and costs. Id., at 55. 
n4 At that stage, it was still open to Tovar to 
request withdrawal of his guilty plea on the OWI 
charge and to substitute a plea of not guilty. See 
Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992). [*16] 
n5 In order to appear at the OWI 
arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse 
despite the suspension of his license; he was 
apprehended en route home. App. 50, 53. 
n6 Prior to asking Tovar whether he wished 
to hire counsel, the court noted that Tovar had 
applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his 
application had been denied because he was 
financially dependent upon his parents. Id, at 46. 
Tovar does not here challenge the absence of 
counsel at sentencing. 
On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of OWI 
for a second time. He was represented by counsel in that 
proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 24, n. 1. 
On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged 
with OWI, this time as a third offense, see Iowa Code § 
32IJ.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while 
license barred, see § 321.561. Iowa law classifies first-
offense OWI as a serious misdemeanor and second-
offense OWI as an aggravated misdemeanor. § § 
321J.2(2)(a)-(b). Third-offense OWI, and any OWI 
offenses thereafter, rank as class "D" felonies. § 
321J.2(2)(c). Represented [*17] by an attorney, Tovar 
pleaded not guilty to both December 2000 charges. 
Record 55. 
In March 2001, through counsel, Tovar filed a 
Motion for Adjudication of Law Points; then7 motion 
urged that Tovar's first OWI conviction, in 1996, could 
not be used to enhance the December 2000 OWI charge 
from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a 
third-offense felony. App. 3-5. n8 Significantly, Tovar 
did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996 
arraignment of his right to counsel prior to pleading 
guilty and at the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that 
his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid - not "full 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" — because he "was 
never made aware by the court . . . of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation." Id., at 3-4. 
n7 See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 10(2) (1992) 
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("Any defense, objection, or request which is that a viable defense will be overlooked. [*20] The 
capable of determination without the trial of the defendant should be admonished that by waiving his 
general issue may be raised before trial by right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain 
motion."); State v. Wilt, 333 N.W.2d 457, 46 0 an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and 
(Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. In addition, the 
adjudication of law points under Iowa Rule of court must ensure the defendant understands the nature 
Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material facts of the charges against him and the range of allowable 
are undisputed). [*18] punishments." Id, at 121. n9 
n8 Tovar conceded that the 1998 OWI 
conviction could be used for enhancement 
purposes. Record 60. 
The court denied Tovar's motion in May 2001, 
explaining: "Where the offense is readily understood by 
laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty 
of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only that 
which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to 
counsel and a willingness to proceed without counsel in 
the face of such awareness." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37 
(brackets in original). Tovar then waived his right to a 
jury trial and was found guilty by the court of both the 
OWI third-offense charge and driving while license 
barred. Id., at 33. Four months after that adjudication, 
Tovar was sentenced. On the OWI third-offense charge, 
he received a 180-day jail term, with all but 30 days 
suspended, three years of probation, and a $ 2,500 fine 
plus surcharges and costs. App. 70-71. For driving while 
license barred, Tovar received a 30-day jail term, to run 
concurrently with the OWI sentence, and a suspended $ 
500 fine. Id., at 71. 
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, [* 19] App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 23-30, but the Supreme Court of Iowa, by a 
4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment 
without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction, 
656 N.W.2d 112 (2003). Iowa's highest court 
acknowledged that "the dangers of proceeding pro se at a 
guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers 
of proceeding pro se at a jury trial, [therefore] the 
inquiries made at these proceedings will also be 
different." Id., at 119. The court nonetheless held that the 
colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty 
plea had been constitutionally inadequate, and instructed 
dispositively: 
"[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead 
guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be 
advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers 
of self-representation in order to make a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his right to c o u n s e l . . . . The trial 
judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are 
defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by 
laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance 
of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk 
n9 The dissenting justices criticized the 
majority's approach as "rigid" and out of line with 
the pragmatic approach this Court described in 
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S Ct. 2389 (1988). 656 N. W. 2d, 
at 122 . They noted that, in addition to advice 
concerning the constitutional rights a guilty plea 
relinquishes, Tovar was "made fully aware of the 
penal consequences that might befall him if he 
went forward without counsel and pleaded 
guilty." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. , 156 L. Ed. 2d 
703, 124 S. Ct. 44(2003), in view of the division of 
opinion on the requirements the Sixth Amendment 
imposes for waiver of counsel [*21] at a plea hearing, 
compare, e.g., United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 
1146-1147 (CA9 2002), with State v. Cashman, 491 
N.W.2d462, 465-466 (S D. 1992), and we now reverse 
the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court. 
II 
The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who 
faces incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical 
stages" of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 
477\ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224, 18 L. Ed. 
2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926. A plea hearing qualifies as a 
"critical stage." White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60, 10 L. 
Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050. Because Tovar received a 
two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had 
a right to counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he 
elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S., at 34, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006. 
A person accused of crime, however, may choose to 
forgo representation. While the Constitution "does not 
force a lawyer upon a defendant," Adams v. United States 
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. 
Ct. 236 (1942), it does require that any waiver of the 
right to counsel be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, 
[*22] see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, 82 L. 
Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938). Tovar contends that his 
waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI 
plea hearing, was insufficiently informed, and therefore 
constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the 
trial judge did not elaborate on the value, at that stage of 
124 S. Ct. 1379; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, *; 
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the case, of an attorney's advice and the dangers of self-
representation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent 
15.nl0 
nlO The United States as amicus curiae reads 
our decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 
L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), to hold that 
a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a 
misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting 
vacation of any term of imprisonment, affords no 
ground for disturbing the underlying conviction. 
Amicus accordingly contends that the 
Constitution should not preclude use of an 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance 
the penalty for a subsequent offense, regardless of 
the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae l l ,n . 3. The 
State, however, does not contest the Iowa 
Supreme Court's determination that a conviction 
obtained without an effective waiver of counsel 
cannot be used to enhance a subsequent charge. 
See ibid. We therefore do not address arguments 
amicus advances questioning that premise. See 
also id., at 29, n. 12. 
[*23] 
We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent 
when the defendant "knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open." Adams, 317 U.S., at 
279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 63 S. Ct. 236. We have not, however, 
prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant 
who states that he elects to proceed without counsel. The 
information a defendant must possess in order to make an 
intelligent election, our decisions indicate, will depend 
on a range of case-specific factors, including the 
defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or 
easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the 
proceeding. See Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, 82 L. Ed. 
1461t58S.Ct. 1019. 
As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that 
before a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se, he 
must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead. 
Farettav. California, 422 US. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 
S. Ct. 2525 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in 
Faretta resisted counsel's aid, preferring to represent 
himself. The Court held that he had a constitutional right 
to self-representation. In recognizing that right, however, 
we cautioned: "Although a defendant need not himself 
have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order 
competently [*24] and intelligently to choose self-
representation, he should be made aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record will establish that he knows what he is doing . . . 
." Id., at 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 101 L. 
Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988), we elaborated on 
"the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to 
which Faretta referred. "At trial," we observed, "counsel 
is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to 
the rules of procedure and evidence, comprehend the 
subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine 
witnesses effectively object to improper prosecution 
questions, and much more." 487 U.S., at 299, n. 13, 101 
L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. Warnings of the pitfalls 
of proceeding to trial without counsel, we therefore said, 
must be "rigorously" conveyed. Id., at 298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We clarified, however, that at 
earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or 
formal colloquy may suffice. Id, at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S.Ct. 2389. 
Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by 
police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we held, 
the warnings required [*25] by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S Ct. 1602 (1966), 
adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, but of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel as well. 487 U.S., at 293, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 
S. Ct. 2389. Miranda warnings, we said, effectively 
convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present 
during questioning. In addition, they inform him of the 
"ultimate adverse consequence" of making uncounseled 
admissions, i.e., his statements may be used against him 
in any ensuing criminal proceeding. 487 U.S., at 293, 
101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. The Miranda 
warnings, we added, "also sufficed . . . to let [the 
defendant] know what a lawyer could 'do for him,'" 
namely, advise him to refrain from making statements 
that could prove damaging to his defense. 487 U.S., at 
294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. 
Patterson describes a "pragmatic approach to the 
waiver question," one thait asks "what purposes a lawyer 
can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in 
question, and what assistance he could provide to an 
accused at that stage," in order "to determine the scope of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of 
warnings and procedures that should be required before a 
waiver [*26] of that right will be recognized." Id, at 
298, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389. We require less 
rigorous warnings pretrial, Patterson explained, not 
because pretrial proceedings are "less important" than 
trial, but because, at that stage, "the full dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less 
substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are 
at trial." Id, at 299, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Tovar's case, the State maintains that, like the 
Miranda warnings we found adequate in Patterson, 
Iowa's plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant 
of his right to counsel, and to assure that his guilty plea is 
124 S. Ct. 1379; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, *; 
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informed and voluntary. Brief for Petitioner 20; Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to the State, 
"makes plain that an attorney's role would be to 
challenge the charge or sentence," and therefore 
adequately conveys to the defendant both the utility of 
counsel and the dangers of self-representation. Brief for 
Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other hand, defends the 
precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme Court, 
see supra, at 7-8, as essential to a knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent plea stage [*27] waiver of counsel. Brief 
for Respondent 15. 
To resolve this case, we need not endorse the State's 
position that nothing more than the plea colloquy was 
needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. 
Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more 
in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel 
at his Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed that he 
wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see 
supra, at 3, and declined the court's offer of "time to hire 
an attorney" at sentencing, when it was still open to him 
to request withdrawal of his plea, see supra, at 4-5, and 
n. 4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant 
must be alerted to his right to the assistance of counsel in 
entering a plea. See Brief for Petitioner 19 
(acknowledging defendant's need to know "retained or 
appointed counsel can assist" at the plea stage by 
"working on the issues of guilt and sentencing"). Indeed, 
the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume that Tovar 
was informed of his entitlement to counsel's aid or, at 
least, to have pretermitted that issue. See 656 N. W. 2d, 
at 117. Accordingly, the State presents a narrower 
question: "Does the Sixth Amendment [*28] require a 
court to give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro 
se defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an 
attorney, that an attorney may provide an independent 
opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that 
without an attorney the defendant risks o verlooking a 
defense?" Pet. for Cert. i. 
Training on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, 
the particular language the Iowa Supreme Court 
employed in announcing the warnings it thought the 
Sixth Amendment required: "The trial judge [must] advise 
the defendant generally that there are defenses to 
criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons 
and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel 
in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a 
viable defense will be overlooked," 656 N. W. 2d, at 121; 
in addition, "the defendant should be admonished that by 
waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the 
opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, 
under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead 
guilty," ibid. Tovar did not receive such advice, and the 
sole question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment 
compels the two admonitions here in controversy. [*29] 
nl 1 We hold it does not. 
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n i l The Supreme Court of Iowa also held 
that "the court must ensure the defendant 
understands the nature of the charges against him 
and the range of allowable punishments." 656 TV. 
W. 2d, at 121. The parties do not dispute that 
Tovar was so informed. 
This Court recently explained, in reversing a lower 
court determination that a guilty plea was not voluntary: 
"The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, 
intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully 
understands the nature of the right and how it would 
likely apply in general in the circumstances - even 
though the defendant may not know the specific detailed 
consequences of invoking it." United States v. Ruiz, 536 
U.S. 622, 629, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586, 122 S Ct. 2450 (2002) 
(emphasis in original). We similarly observed in 
Patterson: "If [the defendant] . . . lacked a full and 
complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing 
from his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing 
that the information it provided [*30] to him satisfied the 
constitutional minimum." 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Iowa Supreme Court gave insufficient consideration 
to these guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted 
admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty 
plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court 
overlooked our observations that the information a 
defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will 
"depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case," Johnson, 304 U.S., 
at 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019; supra, at 9. 
Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral 
attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's 
burden to prove that he did not competently and 
intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel. 
See Watts v. State, 257 N. W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977); Brief 
for Respondent 5, 26-27. In that light, we note that Tovar 
has never claimed that he did not fully understand the 
charge or the range of punishment for the crime prior to 
pleading guilty. Further, he has never "articulated with 
precision" the additional information counsel could have 
provided, given the simplicity of the [*31] charge. See 
Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 
2389; supra, at 4. Nor does he assert that he was unaware 
of his right to be counseled prior to and at his 
arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he 
"may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a 
right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to 
plead guilty." Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added). 
nl2 
nl2 The trial court's comment that Tovar 
appeared without counsel at the arraignment and 
124 S. Ct. 1379; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1837, *; 
72U.S.L.W.4241;17 
the court's inquiry whether Tovar wanted to 
represent himself at that hearing, see App. 8-9, 
hardly lend support to Tovar's suggestion of what 
he "may have" believed. See also id., at 46 
(court's inquiry at sentencing whether Tovar 
"wanted to take some time to hire an attorney"); 
Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992) ("at any 
time before judgment," defendant may request 
withdrawal of guilty plea and substitution of not 
guilty plea). 
Given "the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding [this] case," see Johnson, 304 U.S, at 464, 
82 I. Ed 2d 1461, 58 S Ct 1019 [*32] it is far from 
clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa 
Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision 
whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case 
so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae 
suggests, the admonitions at issue might confuse or 
mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: 
The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared 
mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion 
that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant 
could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a 
realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain 
hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for 
contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt 
disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources 
of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or the 
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defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for 
appointed counsel) will be wasted. Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28-29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. 
We note, finally, that States are free to adopt by 
statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of 
an uncounseled plea they deem useful. See, e.g., Alaska 
Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a) [*33] (2003); Fla. Rule Crim. 
Proc. 3.111(d) (2003); Md. Ct. Rule 4-215 (2002); Minn. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 5.02 (2003); Pa. Rule Crim. Proc. 121, 
comment (2003). We hold only that the two admonitions 
the Iowa Supreme Court ordered are not required by the 
Federal Constitution. 
* * * 
For the reasons slated, the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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